

## Message Text

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15

ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 EA-11 ISO-00 SAJ-01 NIC-01 CIAE-00 DODE-00

PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-10 PA-04 RSC-01

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DRC-01 IO-14 /152 W

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R 151427Z FEB 74

FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6192

INFO AMCONSUL HONG KONG

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY PARIS

USLO PEKING

AMEMBASSY TAIPEI

AMEMBASSY TOKYO

CINCPAC

AMCONSUL LENINGRAD BY POUCH

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CINCPAC FOR POLAD

E. O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, CH, UR

SUBJ: SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS; CHINESE INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS

1. SUMMARY: KAPITSA SAYS HE THINKS THERE IS A STRUGGLE UNDER WAY IN CHINA BETWEEN PRAGMATISTS LED BY CHOU AND EXTREMISTS LED BY THE SHANGHAI FACTION, AND THAT CHOU MAY LOSE OUT. THIS WOULD CAUSE MORE PROBLEMS FOR SOVIETS AND OTHERS. CHINA WOULD TRY TO MOVE INTO SOUTH AND SOUTHEAST ASIA. ILICHEV IS SAID STILL TO BE POISED TO RETURN TO PEKING FOR BORDER TALKS, BUT THERE IS NO PROSPECT FOR SUCCESS. THE USSR IS RESERVING ITS POSITION ON OWNERSHIP OF THE PARACELS AND SPRATLY'S. SINCE CZECHOSLOVAKIA, THE CHINESE HAVE BEEN AFRAID OF WHAT THE USSR MIGHT DO. END SUMMARY

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2. AT THE WEEKLY QUADRIPARTITE MEETING HELD FEB 14, BOTH

BRITISH AMBASSADOR GARVEY AND FRG AMBASSADOR SAHM REPORTED ON DISCUSSIONS THEY HAD WITHIN THE PAST TWO WEEKS WITH M.S. KAPITSA, CHIEF OF THE FIRST FAR EASTERN DIVISION (CHINA, KOREA, MONGOLIA). FOLLOWING ARE HIGHLIGHTS OF KAPITSA'S COMMENTS.

A. BORDER NEGOTIATIONS. KAPITSA SAID THAT THERE HAS BEEN NO INTERRUPTION OF THE BORDER TALKS. IN ILICHEV'S ABSENCE THE TALKS HAVE BEEN CONDUCTED BY A DEPUTY. KAPITSA CONFIRMED THAT ILICHEV WOULD BE RETURNING TO PEKING SOMETIME IN THE NEAR FUTURE. AS KAPITSA SEES IT, THE CHINESE HAVE NO PRESENT INTENTION OF REACHING A SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME IN THE TALKS. THE CHINESE ARE SATISFIED TO CONTINUE THE PRESENT STATE OF TENSION WITH THE USSR, GIVING PRIORITY TO THEIR RELATIONSHIP WITH THE UNITED STATES. THERE IS NO INTENTION ON THE SOVIET SIDE TO UNDERTAKE A DIS-ENGAGEMENT OF SOVIET FORCES FROM THE BORDER AREAS. IN HIS CONVERSATION WITH AMBASSADOR GARVEY, KAPITSA SEEMED TO LAY AS MUCH STRESS ON THE PAMIR SECTION OF THE DISPUTED BORDER AS ON THE USSURI RIVER PORTION.

B. INTERNAL POLITICAL STRUGGLE. KAPITSA COMMENTED THAT THE INTERNAL FACTIONAL STRUGGLE HAS INCREASED IN INTENSITY SINCE THE 10TH PARTY CONGRESS.

(1) KAPITSA CHARACTERIZED THE STRUGGLE AS TAKING PLACE BETWEEN THE "EXTREMISTS" ON THE ONE HAND LED BY THE SHANGHAI RADICALS AND THE "PRAGMATISTS" HEADED BY CHOU EN-LAI. BOTH SIDES HAVE ATTEMPTED TO GAIN THE SUPPORT OF THE ARMY. IN THIS CONTEXT, THE CHANGE OF MILITARY COMMANDS WAS DESIGNED TO WEAKEN THE POSITION OF THE GENERALS.

(2) IN KAPITSA'S VIEW, CHOU IS INTERESTED IN AVOIDING AN ACUTE INTERNAL STRUGGLE SINCE THIS IS BOUND, AMONG OTHER THINGS, TO WEAKEN CHINA'S INTERNATIONAL POSITION. THE STRUGGLE AGAINST CONFUCIUS REPRESENTS A WARNING TO CHOU. KAPITSA SAID THE SOVIETS PREFERRED THE PRAGMATISTS OVER THE EXTREMISTS BUT THEY FEAR THAT CHOU'S POSITION IS BEING WEAKENED AND THAT THE PRAGMATISTS WILL LOSE OUT BECAUSE OF THE AGE FACTOR. IN SOVIET EYES THE EXTREMISTS ARE MUCH MORE DETERMINED TO HEAD A WORLD REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT BASED ON ANTI-SOVIETISM; THIS WOULD SPELL TROUBLE FOR OTHER COUNTRIES AS WELL AS THE SOVIETS.

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KAPITSA SPECULATED THAT CHOU MAY WIND UP AS CHAIRMAN OF THE STANDING COMMITTEE OF THE NATIONAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS AND THAT TENG HSIAO-PING WOULD BECOME PRIME MINISTER.

(3) KAPITSA COMMENTED THAT HE THOUGHT IT WAS A MISTAKE FOR FOREIGNERS TO THINK THEY COULD DO BUSINESS ON A LONG-TERM BASIS WITH THE LIKES OF CHOU EN-LAI AND MAO BECAUSE AGGRESSIVE CHINESE TENDENCIES WOULD SOONER OR LATER REAPPEAR. THIS IS APT ESPECIALLY TO BE THE CASE AMONG THOSE WHO SUCCEED THE PRESENT LEADERSHIP -- PROBABLY THE SHANGHAI RADICALS OR THE

ARMY, OR A COMBINATION OF THE TWO.

(4) IT IS THE SOVIET FEELING THAT MAO IS PRESENTLY DETERMINED TO STRENGTHEN HIS POSITION INTERNALLY AND THAT HE IS DOING SO IN PART BY TAKING A STRONG ANTI-SOVIET POSITION. THIS IS REFLECTED IN THE EXPULSION OF SOVIET DIPLOMATS, FOR EXAMPLE. KAPITSA IMPLIED THAT MAO AND CHOU WERE SOMEWHAT AT ODDS BY SUGGESTING THAT CHOU WOULD BE REMOVED IN ANOTHER TWO OR THREE YEARS BY MAO, ASSUMING THE LATTER OUTLIVED CHOU.

C. TAIWAN. KAPITSA REITERATED THE SOVIET POSITION THAT TAIWAN HAS ALWAYS BELONGED TO CHINA, BUT THE CHINESE THEMSELVES SEEMED TO ACCEPT TWO CHINAS, AS INDICATED BY THEIR ACCEPTANCE OF THE PRESENCE OF TWO CHINESE AMBASSADORS IN WASHINGTON.

D. PARACELS AND THE SPRATLY'S. KAPITSA SAID THIS PROBLEM SHOULD BE SOLVED BY NEGOTIATIONS AND THAT THE SOVIETS WERE RESERVING THEIR POSITION ON THE OWNERSHIP OF THESE ISLANDS.

E. ASIAN COLLECTIVE SECURITY. WHEN THIS SUBJECT WAS TOUCHED UPON, KAPITSA TOOK A RELAXED VIEW, SAYING THIS WAS A TASK FOR THE NEXT FIVE OR EVEN FIFTY YEARS. HE SAID THE SOVIET PRESS EXAGGERATED THE TEMPO AT WHICH THIS CONCEPT SHOULD BE PURSUED. BUT WHEN CHINA BEGINS ITS EXPANSION INTO SOUTH AND SOUTHEAST ASIA, AS IS LIKELY IF THE SHANGHAI RADICALS OR RADICALS COME TO POWER, OTHER ASIAN COUNTRIES WILL BECOME INTERESTED IN A COLLECTIVE SECURITY SCHEME.

F. GENERAL CHINESE POSTURE. KAPITSA SPECULATED THAT PEKING IS AS CAPABLE NOW AS IT HAS BEEN IN THE PAST OF CHANGING  
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ITS FOREIGN POLICY COURSE VERY RAPIDLY. THE SOVIETS WERE PREPARED TO WAIT FOR A MORE FAVORABLE TURN IN CHINESE POLICY. HE ADDED THAT "SINCE CZECHOSLOVAKIA THE CHINESE HAVE REALLY BEEN AFRAID OF WHAT THE SOVIET UNION MIGHT DO." IMPLYING THAT THIS WAS A GOOD PSYCHOLOGICAL POSITION TO BE IN.

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## Message Attributes

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